Nicht auf Deutsch verfügbar.
Bauke Visser
- 21 June 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2569Details
- Abstract
- Whether Federal Reserve Bank presidents have the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: also nonvoting presidents attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. Does voting status change behavior? We find that the data go against the hypothesis that without the voting right, presidents use their public speeches and their meeting interventions to compensate for the loss of formal influence; rather, they support the hypothesis that the voting right makes presidents more involved. We also find that speeches move financial markets less in years that presidents vote. We argue that these discounts are consistent with their communication behavior.
- JEL Code
- D71 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations
D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies