Δεν διατίθεται στα ελληνικά.
Richhild Moessner
- 26 June 2006
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 639Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the degree of financial frictions. Changes in the degree of financial frictions are modelled as changes in parameters of a hybrid New-Keynesian model calibrated for the UK, following Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002). Uncertainty about the degree of financial frictions is modelled as Markov switching between regimes without and with strong financial frictions. Optimal monetary policy is determined for different scenarios of permanent and temporary regime shifts in financial frictions, as well as for variations in financial frictions over the business cycle. Optimal monetary policy is found to be state-dependent. In each state, optimal monetary policy depends on the transition probabilities between the different regimes.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 11 November 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 540Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies optimal discretionary policy with parameter uncertainty about inflation inertia. Optimal policy rules and impulse responses are presented within a hybrid New-Keynesian model estimated for the euro area by Smets (2003). We find that it may be optimal for policy to respond more aggressively to cost-push shocks and real interest rate shocks in the presence of uncertainty about inflation inertia, depending on the form of the central bank's objective function. Moreover, in the cases where optimal policy is not certainty equivalent, we find that inflation returns slightly more gradually to equilibrium following a shock when the degree of inflation inertia is uncertain.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- Eurosystem inflation persistence network
- 10 November 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 539Details
- Abstract
- How monetary policy should be set optimally when the structure of the economy exhibits inflation persistence is an important question for policy makers. This paper provides an overview of the implications of inflation persistence for the design of monetary policy.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- Eurosystem inflation persistence network