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Charles-Enguerrand Coste

11 February 2025
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3022
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Abstract
The digitalisation of payments has accelerated over the last decades with the internet and ever faster and cheaper computing. Now, many believe that decentralised finance (“DeFi”) offers fundamentally new possibilities for trading, payments and settlement. Moreover, for a few years central banks have launched work on what has been called retail and wholesale central bank digital currencies (“CBDC”). Concurrent to the rise of innovative technologies has been the advent of new terminology, which is widely used, but which often seems to be biased, confusing, or is used inconsistently. By providing an etymology of key concepts and reviewing terminology and definitions, this paper also provides a new approach to clarifying the essence of new technologies in the field of payments to facilitate ongoing discussions about their eventual merits and use cases.
JEL Code
B26 : History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches→History of Economic Thought since 1925→Financial Economics
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
25 July 2024
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 353
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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between banks and stablecoins and their issuers, focusing on the mechanical effects on banks’ capital and liquidity ratios when issuing stablecoins or collecting deposits from stablecoin issuers.The analysis reveals that converting retail deposits into stablecoin issuers’ deposits weakens a bank’s liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), turning a retail deposit into a wholesale deposit, even when these funds are reinvested in high-quality liquid assets. If a credit institution issues its own stablecoins, the impact on its LCR depends on whether it can identify the stablecoin holders; unknown holders weaken the LCR which could incentivise banks to issue stablecoins where they can continually identify the holders to benefit from more favourable liquidity treatment. Additionally, banks must either hold the reserves backing the stablecoins as central bank reserves or reinvest them in low-risk assets, making these funds a less effective source for economic financing and maturity transformation compared with traditional retail deposits. The study also finds that when retail customers of bank A buy a stablecoin issued by a non-bank that keeps reserves at bank B, both banks could see an unexpected decline in their liquidity ratios, as bank A loses stable retail deposits and bank B gains volatile wholesale deposits. These insights are crucial to understanding the dynamics between banks and stablecoins in the evolving financial landscape.
JEL Code
E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E49 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Other
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
29 January 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 256
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Abstract
Custodians play a key but discrete role in the global financial market infrastructure. In Europe, they are licensed as “credit institutions ”, a legal requirement for European deposit-taking institutions, and therefore they face the same prudential requirements as “traditional” banks. However, their business model and risk profile are different from those of traditional banks since the core of their activity does not encompass balance sheet transformation and the associated risks.
JEL Code
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
L22 : Industrial Organization→Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior→Firm Organization and Market Structure