DISCUSSION: MONETARY POLICY AND HETEROGENEITY: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

BY
FLORIN BILBIIE

Marcus Hagedorn¹

¹University of Oslo

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Models of Consumption

Literature:

Enrich the Consumption block of the New Keynesian model

Standard: Complete Markets (RANK models)

$$u'(c_t) = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(c_{t+1})$$

TANK models: Add Hand-to-mouth consumer

$$c_t = y_t$$
.

Heterogeneous Agent Incomplete markets

$$u'(c_t) = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})E_tu'(c_{t+1}).$$

BILBIIE: ANALYTICAL HANK

- Analytical HANK is a Stochastic TANK:
 - Unconstrained agents (S): Full access to credit markets.
 - Constrained agents (H): Hand-to-mouth.
 - But with transition probabilities:
 - $S \rightarrow H$ with prob. 1 s.
 - $H \rightarrow S$ with prob. 1 h.
- Consumption:

S type:
$$u'(c_t^S) = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})E_tu'(c_{t+1})$$

= $\beta(1 + r_{t+1})[su'(c_{t+1}^S) + (1 - s)u'(c_{t+1}^H)]$
H type: $c_t^H = y_t^H$

BILBIIE: ANALYTICAL HANK

Linearizing Analytical HANK:

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 $\lambda = \frac{1-s}{2-s-h}$ (ss-mass of H-types).

• For $\chi = 1$: Standard Euler Equation.

$$egin{array}{lcl} c_t &=& 1E_tc_{t+1} - \sigmarac{1-\lambda}{1-\lambda}(i_t-E_t\pi_{t+1}-
ho_t), \ &=& E_tc_{t+1} - \sigma(i_t-E_t\pi_{t+1}-
ho_t) \ \end{array}$$
 where $\delta &\equiv& 1+(\chi-1)rac{1-s}{1-\lambda\chi}=1$

INVESTMENT

• Resource constraint logic: Y = C + S = C + I.

$$C \uparrow \Rightarrow S \downarrow \Rightarrow I \downarrow$$

 \hookrightarrow Effect on Aggregate Demand C + I???

- It matters for multipliers in Christiano, Eichenbaum & Rebelo (JPE, 2005).
- It matters for monetary policy transmission mechanism in Rupert & Sustek (On the Mechanics of NK Models).

Understand Inv. and interaction with MPC-hetero.

Fundamental and Policy χ

- χ is considered a fundamental parameter.
- Seems right if Y is driven by fundamental shocks (technology, preferences, ...)

$$\hookrightarrow \chi^{\textit{Fundamental}}$$

- BUT: χ seems not to be policy-invariant.
- Two fiscal policies with same Y effect might have a very different distributional impact

$$\hookrightarrow \chi^{Policy}$$

QUANTITATIVE IMPORTANCE OF χ

- χ = 1: Complete Markets
- χ^{Policy} very different from 1 (Hagedorn, Manovskii & Mitman: The Fiscal Multiplier).
 - Deficit financed govt' spending: χ^{Policy} : 1.3 1.5.
 - Tax financed govt' spending: χ^{Policy} : 0.6 0.7.
- χ^{Fundamental} close to 1 (e.g. Luetticke's JMP,...)
- Moving $\chi^{Fundamental}$ requires hard work:
 - Find high MPC studies (Fagerang, Holm, Natvik for Norway), assume is all non-durable consumption
 - Large tailor-made redistribution
 - ...
- \Rightarrow RANK \approx a-HANK \approx HANK

WHAT MATTERS

Add nominal bonds to a-HANK or HANK. No further assumptions needed.

- Reinterpretation of Friedman (63, 68, 79):
 inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon . . .
- Fiscal determination of long-run inflation rate, equal to the growth rate of nominal fiscal variables.
- Price level determinate for all specifications of monetary policy (no Taylor principle). Determined by monetary and fiscal policy.
- Liquidity trap Puzzles disappear
 - Divergence of fiscal multiplier at frictionless limit? NO
 - · Contractionary TFP shocks expansionary? NO
 - Forward guidance infinitely powerful? NO (Hagedorn, Luo, Manovskii, Mitman)
- Estimation: See Kurt's talk tomorrow.

CONCLUSION: A-HANK

Difference:

 $Nominal\ a\text{-}HANK \leftrightarrow RANK$



Difference:

Real HANK ↔ Real a-HANK ↔ RANK