




# Discussion of Yannick Kalantzis et al. “Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy in a Semi-Open Economy”

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# Outline

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- 1 Description of model and results
  - 2 Comments
  - 3 Conclusion



Description of the model


# RER depreciation and capital outflow

- Very nice paper! Clear and insightful.
- The paper aims at generating a RER depreciation accompanied by accumulation of foreign assets as a consequence of growth acceleration
- The authors want to achieve this with a model that could resemble the Chinese experience:
  - 1 Limited international capital mobility
  - 2 Net capital outflow via foreign reserves
  - 3 Underdeveloped domestic financial market
  - 4 Very high growth rate



# Borrowing constraints and exchange rate depreciation

Current account China



- In the open-economy version of the model the RER depreciates
  - ▶ As there are limits to borrowing, excess domestic saving depresses domestic prices and generates a RER depreciation
- In the semi-open economy, the central bank provides the assets to savers: it purchases foreign assets on their behalf.
  - ▶ Still, excessive saving generates a depreciation
  - ▶ **Domestic frictionless financial markets would deliver an appreciation**

# The model

- Two households, two-state endowment economy
- Endowment of households alternate btw high and low; endowment is perfectly negatively correlated across two groups of households
- Collateral constraint for borrowers  $r_t L_t \leq \phi Y_t$
- Separable preferences in tradable and non-tradable goods
  - ▶ Say **all** endowments increase. Credit constraints imply tradable consumption increases less than endowment (saving  $\uparrow$ ).
  - ▶ Marginal utility of tradables  $>$  Marginal utility non-tradables and RER ( $\rho = \frac{P_N}{P_T}$ )  $\downarrow$ .
- Under capital controls, central bank channels domestic saving into foreign assets.



Comments

## Growth and RER depreciation

- It is not fully transparent which equilibrium does the policymaker try to reproduce
- What would an IRBC model tell us about the real exchange rate response to growth shocks?



# Financial underdevelopment and optimal depreciation

“The main reason for optimal depreciation is financial underdevelopment”

- e.g. IRBC with perfect risk sharing:

$$\Delta \widehat{C} - \Delta \widehat{C}^* = \Delta \widehat{RER}$$

So, constant  $\widehat{C}^*$ , an increase in consumption implies a depreciation.

- Is this what the policymaker aims at achieving?





## Financial underdevelopment and optimal depreciation cont'd

The real problem is not the depreciation as such, but the “large” trade surplus that has been associated with that

- Is that optimal?
- Here the paper swings a bit between positive and normative analysis.
- **Positive Problem:** How to generate a depreciation and a current account surplus with a growth shock?

## Financial underdevelopment and optimal depreciation cont'd

- Under **incomplete markets** there might be a tendency for a current account deficit: wealth effect drives consumption of tradables above its current production.
- “Need” a mechanism to generate an increase in saving.
- E.g. a “top-of-lap” calculation using a two-country DSGE model (Kolasa-Lombardo 2013) get...



## Are the assumptions reasonable for a large economy?

- The debate around the undervaluation of the RMB was motivated by its alleged detrimental effect on e.g. the U.S. economy.
- This suggests the following questions:
  - ① Is it plausible to assume that the optimal policy does not take into account **foreign variables**?
  - ② Is it plausible to assume that the equilibrium is not the solution to a **non-cooperative game**?

## International policy spillovers

- The non-cooperative equilibrium generated by self-oriented currency manipulations can bring about large welfare losses (e.g. De Paoli-Lipińska (2012))
- Should we think of the current set-up as leading to similar conclusions?

## Is this the best policy among the plausible ones?

- In their conclusion the authors mention **domestic financial liberalization**.
- It seems to me that the **first order inefficiency** in the economy is the domestic credit friction
- Currently there are talks of a Chinese policy-induced credit bubble.
- Apparently the Chinese government sets credit targets.
- Is domestic **credit control a policy instrument**?
- If we allow for this instrument, would we get an appreciation?

# Is this the best policy among the plausible ones? cont'd

- In a number of papers dealing with the current crisis, **credit policy** can alleviate the domestic financial friction and bring the economy closer to the first best (e.g. Gertler-Karadi 2011)
- In these models the policymaker borrows from savers and lends to borrowers bypassing or mitigating the financial friction: wouldn't this policy be better than the reserve policy?



## Solve a self-inflicted problem?

- In the model the Ramsey policy can be (slightly) better than no intervention with free capital mobility.
- In the real world letting a **central bank pick assets** that are optimal for the private sector might entail some inefficiencies.
- Wouldn't there be **efficiency gains** in simply opening the capital market?

# Robustness

- The paper shows that the depreciation would disappear if **growth is faster in the tradable sector** (Balassa-Samuelson channel). Isn't this a more reasonable scenario?
- Yet, see my example in a fully fledged DSGE model where growth was **only** in tradables.



Conclusion

# Conclusion

- Very interesting paper
- Provides a different perspective on the undervaluation of the renminbi
- Not fully clear whether it provides sufficient grounds for a policy combining capital controls and reserve accumulation